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Abstract 
Financial systemic risk – defined as the risk of collapse of an entire financial system vis-à-vis 
any one individual financial institution – is making inroads into academic research in the 
aftermath of the late 2000s Global Financial Crisis. We shed light on this new concept by 
investigating the value of various systemic financial risk measures in the corporate failure 
predictions of listed nonfinancial firms. Our sample includes 225,813 firm-quarter observations 
covering 8,604 US firms from 2000 Q1 to 2016 Q4. We find that financial systemic risk is 
incrementally useful in forecasting corporate failure over and above the predictions of the 
traditional accounting-based and market-based factors. Our results are stronger when the firm 
in consideration has higher equity volatility relative to financial sector volatility, smaller size 
relative to the market, and more debts in current liabilities. The combined evidence suggests 
that systemic risk is a useful supplementary source of information in capital markets. 
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Due to its obvious importance for investors, firms and policy-makers, the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) has piqued interest among academics and practitioners in bankruptcy 
prediction, which has arguably been one of the most important topics in subjects such as 
accounting, economics and finance over the past decades (e.g., Altman, 1964; Ohlson, 1980; 
Shumway, 2001; Campbell et al., 2008; Jones, 2017). With few exceptions, this strand of 
literature has relied on corporate accounting ratios (i.e., accounting-based models) and/or 
security market information (i.e., market-based models). These indicators are all firm-specific 
information, which are under the unconscious assumptions that they contain complete 
information about bankruptcy. However, exogenous factors that might increase the damage 
should be taken into account. There was unprecedented popularity of systemic risks in the 
financial sector (e.g., Benoit et al., 2017), which warrants research attention. We propose and 
confirm that systemic risk, as an exogenous factor, shows a strong and significant association 
with a nonfinancial firm’s bankruptcy.  
One of the fundamental points facing financial market regulation and supervision after the GFC 
is how increased systemic risk in the financial sector, particularly in banks, affects their 
corporate borrowers. Therefore, many papers have tried to track the impacts (e.g., Chava and 
Purnanandam, 2011; Chodorow-Reich, 2013). However, due to the complexity of the financial 
system and the limitation of perfect measures, the effects of systemic risk are particularly hard 
to track (Linn and Weagley, 2018). We attempt to understand the spill-over effects of financial 
sector systemic risk from an ‘extreme event’ perspective, namely bankruptcy. We focus on the 
association between systemic risk and the likelihood of nonfinancial firms’ bankruptcy. This 
offers us opportunities to attempt to explain how systemic risk affects a firm’s behaviour and 
what sorts of firms with specific characteristics will be affected the most.  
Our rationale for choosing financial systemic risk as a predictor stems from extensive research 
of systemic risk in recent years. We were motivated by Allen et al. (2012), Chauvet et al. (2015), 
Giglio et al. (2016) and Acharya et al. (2017), who document that financial systemic risk can 




link systemic risk and macroeconomics include, for example, the changes in the demand side 
and supply side of investment activity (Allen et al. 2012) and the business cycle (Hall, 2011). 
More specific to our context, the financial system establishes and changes the financing and 
investing environment which nonfinancial firms are living in, and thus has an impact on 
nonfinancial firms1 . From the perspective of managerial risk preference theory, when the 
financial sector is less risk-averse, systemic risk is relatively high. 
On the one hand, as funding sources and costs are more uncertain, more risk-taking in the 
financial sector means the supply of funds will decrease to those risk-averse firms, which will 
then limit their growth opportunities (Allen et al., 2012). On the other hand, those risk-seeking 
firms tend to invest in riskier projects or tend to over-invest during a period of high systemic 
risk (Adachi-Sato and Vithessonthi, 2017). Both of the cases negatively impact on the health 
of a firm (e.g., weaker and less certain profitability (Chava and Purnanandam, 2011)), 
especially when a firm is vulnerable (i.e., in financial distress). Thus, the systemic risk might 
contain useful information about a firm’s bankruptcy. Another possible way to explain it is 
from the perspective of asset pricing. Linn and Weagley (2018) document that the stock of US-
listed nonfinancial firms reflects the effect of systemic risk in price that is incorporated by the 
investors after systemic events. Since the stock price is a significant predictor of firm 
bankruptcy, from a securities market perspective, it is not unreasonable to develop systemic 
risk information-contained variables as predictors of nonfinancial firm bankruptcy. Also, 
Giglio et al. (2016) argue that financial market distress is likely to be ahead of monetary policy, 
but the policy is not sufficient enough to diffuse systemically risky conditions which can finally 
lead to adverse macroeconomic consequences. Therefore, information about systemic risk 
could release information of future economic conditions that nonfinancial firms must deal with. 
In particular, financial sector equity volatility is much more informative about future real 
activity, compared with nonfinancial volatility (Giglio et al., 2016). 
Specifically, we ask two questions in this study. First, is financial systemic risk information 
useful in forecasting corporate bankruptcy? Second, can financial systemic risk forecast 
                                                        




corporate bankruptcy over and above the predictions of the traditional accounting-based and 
market-based factors? With a sub-sample of 83,795 observations based on monthly observation 
intervals from January 2000 to January 2012, our first-stage analysis investigates the use of 
systemic risk measures documented in the literature on firm bankruptcy prediction. In the 
second-stage analysis, we construct and test our novel systemic risk variables using the full 
sample, which includes 225,813 firm-quarter observations of 8,604 listed firms on the US stock 
market from 2000 Q1 to 2016 Q4. Then we propose our AMS model that incorporates systemic 
risk information into conventional accounting and market variables-based models and finally 
evaluate it.  
The first-stage results show that the systemic risk in the US financial sector is positively related 
to, and contains useful information about nonfinancial firms’ bankruptcy risks. We also find 
that positive change in systemic risk is also positively related to bankruptcy, but these effects 
do not apply to all the measures. In the second-stage analysis, we find that our proposed 
variables, which contain both individual firm-level information and financial sector systemic 
risk information, have strong predictabilities in nonfinancial firms’ bankruptcy prediction. In 
detail, financial sector equity volatility is particularly informative in bankruptcy prediction. 
Credit condition measures also show high predictive power when interacting with firm-specific 
characteristics. Compared to the accounting-variables-only and market variables-only models, 
the systemic risk variables-only model is an alternative for bankruptcy prediction. The 
incorporation of systemic risk information also increases prediction accuracy. Furthermore, we 
find that a firm, which has higher equity volatility relative to financial sector equity volatility, 
smaller relative size, and more debts in current liabilities, is more likely to be affected by 
financial market distress and adverse credit conditions, and is thus more likely to go bankrupt. 
Our primary contribution in this study is to explore the possible role of systemic risk measures 
in corporate bankruptcy prediction and its significance. To the best of our knowledge, this paper 
offers a first look at the value of financial systemic risk in corporate bankruptcy prediction. In 
the stream of literature finding reliable predictors of firm bankruptcy, more are based on firm-




Shumway, 2001; Hillegeist et al., 2004; Campbell et al., 2008), or other firm-specific data, such 
as ownership structure and CEO compensation (e.g. Jones, 2017), technical efficiency (Eling, 
and Jia, 2018), size (e.g. Ciampi and Gordini, 2013; Gupta et al., 2018) and tail risk (Gupta and 
Chaudhry, 2019). Only a few have attempted, like the present paper, to examine time-variant 
data into prediction models, such as those by Christidis and Gregory (2010), and Tinoco and 
Wilson, (2013). However, their research is predominantly focused on incorporating 
macroeconomic variables. Apart from adding possible time-variant predictors, our findings that 
the incorporation of systemic risk information can improve the accuracy and prediction ability 
of the bankruptcy prediction models also provide support for financial systemic risk as a 
supplementary source of information in capital markets. Our paper may be the first paper to 
test exogenous factors other than the macroeconomic index in bankruptcy predicting research.  
In addition, our study contributes to the strand of literature that demonstrates the importance 
of including industry effects in corporate bankruptcy prediction (e.g., Chava and Jarrow, 2004 
and the references therein). Unlike the previous studies which highlight the different likelihood 
of bankruptcy for firms in different industries with otherwise identical balance sheets, to the 
best of our knowledge, we are the first to explore the forecasting of bankruptcy of firms in one 
industry (the nonfinancial industry in our sample) using the information from another industry 
(the financial industry). We also add discussion on the impact of financial sector shocks on 
nonfinancial firms (e.g., Lemmon and Robert, 2010; Chava and Purnanandam, 2011; 
Chodorow-Reich, 2013). Not much attention has been paid to the bankruptcy perspective; 
probably due to the overlooking of the role of systemic risk prior to the GFC. Yet, both 
economic intuition and recent literature on systemic risk suggest that the systemic risk of the 
financial sector should be an important predictor for nonfinancial firms’ bankruptcy predictions 
given the systemic importance of the financial industry vis-à-vis nonfinancial industries. 
Nevertheless, the findings from the extant literature using a smaller dataset from one or more 
decades ago need updating, and call into question the possibility of new predictors in the period 
building up to the GFC and the post-crisis period.   




management and constructs an early warning system for practitioners. Our findings highlight 
the importance of risk management in the financial sector, and imply that financial institutions 
and investors/creditors should take early measures to defend themselves from risky investing 
situations when systemic risk rises, while firm managers should adjust firm strategies when 
potential bankruptcy hazards are growing due to systemic risk. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant 
background literature, Section 3 describes the data and empirical methodology, and Section 4 
presents the empirical results from the logistic regressions of firm bankruptcy prediction 
models. A summary of discussion and evaluation are then presented in Section 5, and finally, 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. Background Literature  
Our paper relates to two strands of the literature. It draws upon studies that seek to identify the 
determinants of corporate bankruptcy and models to predict corporate bankruptcy with these 
determinants. It is also linked with studies highlighting the importance of and investigating the 
possible roles of systemic risk in the aftermath of the 2008 GFC.  
In the literature, the real debate is on the choice of predictors for bankruptcy. Typically, the 
development of conventional models is based on searching the linear relations between i) 
accounting ratios and bankruptcy (i.e., accounting-based models); and ii) market information 
and bankruptcy (i.e., market-based models). Arguably, the accounting-based models lack 
theoretical grounding. For instance, the preparation of accounting data is affected by 
accounting rules in a period that might hinder a true representation of a firm’s health and varies 
over time (Agarwal and Taffler, 2008). Also, the prediction accuracy is associated with the 
development of accounting-based models. Therefore, these models should be redeveloped 
frequently because simply updating the model coefficients does not improve the performance 
(Begley et al., 1996; Hillegeist et al., 2004). Previous studies also investigate the performance 
of market variables and confirm their performance in firm bankruptcy prediction models by 
employing models such as the Merton Distance to Default (DD) Model (Merton, 1974) which 




the explanatory variables’ structure. 
Researchers have tried to combine accounting models and market models. Following the work 
by Shumway (2001), a majority of later hazard models incorporate accounting and market 
variables in simple discrete-time logit models (e.g., Chava and Jarrow, 2004; Campbell et al., 
2008). The traditional indicators previous paper uses include accounting ratios, such as 
profitability and liquidity, and market ratios, such as relative size and price. These studies are 
sound evidence that accounting ratios do not include complete information about the 
bankruptcy, and market indicators might complement the deficiency. Some firm-specific 
characteristics other than traditional indicators have been examined recently, namely ownership 
structure and CEO compensation (e.g., Jones, 2017), technical efficiency (Eling, and Jia, 2018), 
size (e.g. Ciampi and Gordini, 2013; Gupta et al., 2018) and tail risk (Gupta and Chaudhry, 
2019). However, their attempts are limited to firm-level indicators and have failed to examine 
time-variant data into the prediction models. Some pioneering researchers have recently been 
trying to explore exogenous indicators of bankruptcy, but they predominantly focus on macro-
level characteristics. Relevant studies include the paper by Christidis and Gregory (2010) who 
find that the inflation rate and the interest rate can add to the predictive power of bankruptcy. 
Tinoco and Wilson (2013) find that adding macroeconomic data into a credit model is 
incrementally useful in UK-listed firms’ bankruptcy predictions. Eling and Jia (2018) also 
develop models that mix firm-specific data and macroeconomic data in insurance companies’ 
failure predictions.  
In the aftermath of the 2008 GFC, systemic risk has been widely used in macroeconomic 
forecasting. Examples can be found in Giglio et al. (2016) who empirically investigate 19 
systemic risk measures and find equity volatility in the financial sector is informative for future 
real economic activities. Allen et al. (2012) also state that ‘high levels of systemic risk in the 
banking sector impact the macro economy through aggregate lending activity’. The association 
between volatility and real economic activities has gradually become a consensus among 
academics (e.g., Bloom, 2009; Schwert, 2011; Chauvet et al., 2015). Apart from volatility, 




2012; Schularick and Taylor, 2012). More specific to our context, the existing literature 
extensively explored the impact of financial system shocks on nonfinancial firms’ activities. 
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) find that bank lending significantly declined during the GFC. 
Lemmon and Roberts (2010) find that firm financing and investment activity are negatively 
influenced by the adverse shock in credit supply. Chava and Purnanandam (2011) also confirm 
the relationship and find evidence during the Russia crisis that bank-dependent firms 
experienced weaker profitability. Chodorow-Reich (2013) shows that less bank lending 
availability reduces employment in a firm after the 2008 GFC. Adachi-Sato and Vithessonthi 
(2017) find evidence in the US that high systemic risk leads to overinvestments in firms. Linn 
and Weagley (2018) document that US-listed nonfinancial firms’ stock reflects the effect of 
systemic risk in price that is incorporated by the investors after systemic events. All these 
results raise questions about how risks in the financial sector can affect the performance of a 
nonfinancial firm. Our paper directly addresses this question. 
Although the relationship between financial sector shocks and nonfinancial firms has been 
widely explored, none of the above papers have examined the role of systemic risk in corporate 
bankruptcy prediction. This is an important task given the recently established connection 
between systemic risk and real economic activities, especially in the period build-up to the 
GFC and the post-crisis period. Our paper attempts to fill this gap. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Dataset 
We searched the entire CRSP database for listed firms and identified firms with sufficient 
bankruptcy information, accounting information and market information. Finally, we obtained 
a sample consisting of 8,604 listed nonfinancial companies on the US stock market at any time 
between 2000 Q1 and 2016 Q4, which includes the ‘dotcom bubble’ in 2002 and the GFC in 
2008. Observations are based on quarterly observation intervals, which we believe are superior 
to monthly intervals and yearly intervals: one month is too short for a firm to respond when the 
prediction shows a trend of bankruptcy and a yearly prediction might be less useful in practice 




the course of one year.  
To maximise the information captured by variables, accounting variables are constructed 
quarterly, while market variables, including systemic risk variables, are constructed monthly. 
This stems from the fact that the effects of accounting variables on bankruptcy prediction are 
slightly weaker as data are collected more frequently, while the consequences of market 
variables are stronger (Campbell et al., 2008). Many systemic risk measures should contain 
more information if are constructed with higher frequency data. For example, volatility plays 
a significant role in amplifying systemic risk and lower frequency data smooths out volatility; 
hence, one may expect even stronger effects of volatility in higher frequency data. This is 
particularly true in security market information-based prediction models (i.e., market-based 
models). Only listed firms recorded in the CRSP database stock file are included in the sample. 
Firms are identified by CRSP Permanent Number Variable Name (PERMNO code), ignoring 
changes in names or capital structure. Thus, the entire market history of an individual firm can 
be tracked according to PERMNO, which neither changes during an issue's trading history nor 
is reassigned after an issue ceases trading. Then, according to the Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code, firms belonging to the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate sector are 
excluded from our sample. This is reasonable as we are exploring effects from the financial 
sector and the systemic risk to nonfinancial firms.  
The definition of what constitutes firm bankruptcy can be regarded as the outcome of the 
analysis process. Referring to earlier discussions and recent papers, this paper quotes Agarwal 
and Taffler’s (2008) definition that bankruptcy is one of the following: liquidation, 
administration/receivership, or a valueless company. Therefore, firms that have failed are 
identified as those that meet the delisting codes between 450 and 490, and 550 and 587 
according to the CRSP; otherwise they are defined as non-failed. Firms normally stop 
providing financial statements before they are legally bankrupt (Tinoco and Wilson, 2013), so 
for the firms that are identified as failed according to the above codes, we take their final 
statement as the last observation. Quarterly financial data of both financial firms and 




WRDS. Daily and monthly market data are provided by CRSP. In addition, financial market 
credit condition data are taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis2. Finally, covering 
the period between 2000 and 2016, 225,813 firm-quarter observations for a total of 8,604 
nonfinancial firms are collected for our main empirical analysis. 
3.2. Variables selection 
3.2.1. Systemic risk measures 
Regarding systemic risk measures3, we use several popular systemic risk measures proposed 
in the literature (see Appendix Table A.1a.) in our first-stage analysis. In a univariate logit 
regression, we test 21 financial systemic risk measures. The data to construct the measures are 
mostly adopted from data documented in Giglio et al. (2016)4, except for two other measures 
that are relevant to our study: Component Extended Shortfall (CES) from Banulescu and 
Dumitrescu (2015) and the WSF from López-Espinosa et al. (2012). The details can be found 
in Appendix 1. It is interesting to know how the systemic risk in the core of the financial sector 
can affect nonfinancial firms, and thus the data used in calculating measures were from the US 
financial institutions that rank in the top 20 in terms of market capitalisation in a given month5.  
The measures used in our analysis measure systemic risk from different angles. They are 
categorised into four categories, as specified in Giglio et al. (2016): institution-specific risk and 
liquidity, co-movement and contagion, volatility and instability, and credit condition. There are 
also two measures, CES and short-term Wholesale Funding (WSF), which are not covered by 
Giglio et al. (2016). CES is a measure of interconnectedness, while WSF is total short-term 
borrowings over total assets calculated quarterly, which captures liquidity risk exposure. It is 
converted to monthly measures by assuming it changes arithmetically between quarters. The 
data for calculating CES and SF are from CRSP and Datastream, respectively.    
                                                        
2 Available at: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/ 
3 Considering the existence of the time gap between systemic risk in the financial sector and its transporting to individual 
firms, we take one month/quarter lag for all systemic risk measures and our proposed systemic risk variables in predictions 
depending on our observation interval. 
4 We would like to thank Giglio, Kelly, and Pruitt for sharing these measures data and code, which can be downloaded from 
https://sethpruitt.net/research/downloads/. 
5 Note size concentration is calculated based on the top 100 financial institutions (Giglio et al., 2016), and WSF is calculated 




3.2.2. Indicators in full model 
This section describes the indicators used in our second-stage analysis. All the selected 
nonfinancial firms’ accounting and market variables in our full models are winsorised at the 5% 
and 95% levels to reduce the effect of possible spurious outliers caused by a few extreme values. 
All firms in the sample have full coverage of the subsequently described variables6. 
Accounting ratios that reflect a firm’s leverage, profitability and liquidity, were carefully 
selected. These three types of accounting ratios are standard and widely accepted measures that 
are employed in prediction models (e.g., Shumway, 2001; Chava and Jarrow, 2004; Campbell 
et al., 2008). Leverage reflects the long-term financial position of a firm and is a significant 
indicator of bankruptcy in the paper by Zmijewski (1984). More recent papers, such as those 
by Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004), and Christidis and Gregory (2010), have tested 
it and confirmed its consistency and contribution to bankruptcy prediction models. The higher 
gearing a firm has, the more financial risk and therefore bankruptcy risk a firm might face. We 
construct the variable Total Liabilities/Total Assets (TLTA) to capture the gearing ratio, which 
is calculated by total liabilities over total assets. The expected sign of TLTA is positive. The 
profitability of a firm is suggested to be an important indicator of bankruptcy in most studies 
since more profitable firms would be expected to be more liquid and lowlier geared, and thus 
less likely to go bankrupt.  
Original data, such as net income, earnings before interest and tax, retained earnings, etc., can 
report firms’ profitability at different earning process stages. Using net income data collected 
from CRSP/Compustat Merged, we construct net income relative to total assets (NITA) as a 
predictor of a firm’s bankruptcy7 . When the net income is not able to cover the financial 
liabilities, the firm is more likely to go bankrupt. On the other hand, the market, as well as 
stakeholders, tend to negatively judge a less profitable firm, which can lead to a decrease in 
market value (Pindado et al., 2008). Therefore, NITA is expected to have a negative value, 
                                                        
6 Appendix Table A.1b lists the details of indicators used in this study. 
7 Net Income to Market-valued Total Assets (NIMTA) is an alternative profitability measure (e.g. Campbell et al., 2008; Gupta 
and Chaudhry, 2019). As far as we are concerned, NIMTA is a ‘half market variable, as it is constructed by dividing net income 
by market value of total assets. However, we construct pure accounting variables which enable us to make a comparison of 




which is in line with the findings in the literature (e.g., Campbell et al., 2008; Tinoco and 
Wilson, 2013). Liquidity reflects the ability of a firm to meet its short-term commitments and 
the potential to generate working capital funds (Gregory and Christidis, 2010). A firm with 
good liquidity conditions is more capable of employing itself to pay the upcoming expenses 
such as interest payments and tax payments, and might be able to take measures to prevent 
bankruptcy until current conditions become better. Regarding long-run operation, firms may 
not maximise liquidity because over-liquidity will cause firms to lack productive assets. A 
failed firm is more likely to face liquidity problems because of inadequate cash and cash 
equivalents (Gupta and Chaudhry 2019). This paper employs Working Capital/Total Assets 
(WCTA) as a measure of a firm’s liquidity, which is constructed by dividing working capital 
by total assets (Shumway, 2001). 
Previous studies have investigated the predictive power of predictors that employ market data 
to predict firm bankruptcy (Campbell et al. 2008; Tinoco and Wilson, 2013). We include three 
market predictors in the proposed model. The first variable is RELSIZE, which considers the 
value of a firm’s market capitalisation relative to the market capitalisation of the S&P 500. The 
relative size of a firm’s capitalisation allows the consideration of non-firm-specific factors that 
affect firm bankruptcy by dividing by the S&P 500 index. The small firm market value indicates 
that traders are discounting equity value as a firm is approaching bankrupt (Chava and Jarrow, 
2004). Therefore, there is a negative relationship between a firm’s relative size and the risk of 
bankruptcy.  
However, the changes in the relative size of a firm are also aspects that traders are looking at. 
These changes can be captured by EXRET, which is our second market variable. This indicator 
contains the information for both the relative size of the firms and changes in market returns 
(Campbell et al., 2008). EXRET is calculated by monthly returns of the firm deducted from the 
value-weighted market return (CRSP NISE/AMEX index return) measured in the most recent 
one-month period. A firm which has more positive relative returns is less likely to fail (Gupta 
and Chaudhry, 2019). Thus, EXRET has an expected positive value. The last market variable 




Gregory (2010) and Tinoco and Wilson (2013) examined equity prices as an indicator of 
bankruptcy and confirmed that it has a positive effect on the predictive power of the model. 
First, the original firms’ daily stock price obtained from CRSP was winsorised above $15. The 
NYSE and NASDAQ commonly delist stocks that are under a minimum price requirement of 
$1. Then these daily data were constructed into quarterly data, and then the log value of the 
winsorised price of the firms. PRICE indicates the equity value on the market. Thus a firm that 
has a high price below $15 is more likely to go bankrupt, as Campbell et al. (2008) argued. 
PRICE is expected to have a negative sign coefficient, i.e., price decreases the probability of 
bankruptcy. 
This paper also involves model comparisons with previously proposed models. Therefore, the 
accounting and market variables that emerged in those models are also included in the present 
paper. The models they proposed have been tested and have shown consistent validity across 
time (e.g., Gregory and Christidis, 2010). Using newly collected data within our sample period, 
we meticulously follow the methods they used to construct the variables required in their 
models (see Altman, 1968; Shumway, 2001; Campbell et al., 2008 and the description therein).   
Based on our results from the first-stage analysis, we further construct four novel systemic risk 
measures that link systemic financial risk measures with the individual nonfinancial firm. The 
first novel systemic risk measure we propose is FMVOL. To construct this variable, we first 
calculate the standard deviation of each firm’s equity stock return over the last month as the 
measure of a firm’s equity volatility, and then we take the average of standard deviation of the 
top 20 largest financial institutions’ equity stock return over the last month as the measure of 
financial sector volatility (following Giglio et al., 2016).8 FMVOL is the ratio of firm volatility 
over financial sector volatility. It is proposed in order to capture relative volatility between the 
individual firm and the financial sector. Systemic risk cannot be diversified; thus, systemic 
volatility can be regarded as a benchmark of volatility. We hypothesise that, in a certain period, 
if a nonfinancial firm’s relative equity volatility is larger than financial sector systemic 
volatility, the firm may face a higher level of risks than financial sector systemic risk provides, 
                                                        




or will be more sensitive in responding to the risk. A positive sign of the FMVOL variable’s 
estimate is therefore expected.  
Our second systemic variable is RELVOL, which represents the systemic risk’s effects on a 
firm’s bankruptcy according to firm size. It is calculated by multiplying the firm’s relative size 
by the average daily equity volatility of the top 20 largest financial institutions in the previous 
month. RELVOL is an interaction variable designed to examine the interaction effects of 
systemic risk on firm size. Shumway (2001) argues that a small market value reflects the fact 
that investors are discounting the value of equity, and thus, it has a negative expected sign. 
However, by incorporating systemic risk measure (assuming RELVOL will have a negative 
sign), it is expected that larger firms are less vulnerable when facing the same level of systemic 
financial risk than smaller firms and therefore less likely to go bankrupt.  
Third, many researchers have found relationships between credit spread and the real economy 
(e.g., Gilchrist et al., 2009; Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 2012). As credit spread is reflecting the 
credit conditions, it may contain useful information in predicting firm bankruptcy. We propose 
another systemic risk measure, CLDEF, which is the firm debt in current liabilities multiplied 
by default spread (BAA bond yield minus AAA bond yield). Default spread represents the 
financial market credit condition (Giglio et al., 2016), and firm debts in current liabilities 
represent the number of debts in short-term that a firm exposure to the systemic risk. The firms 
who have more debts in current liabilities take more risks when credit condition in the market 
is adverse (i.e., default spread is relatively large), meaning that CLDEF is assumed to have a 
positive sign.  
Since a high leverage ratio in financial institutions is associated with the real economy 
(Schularick and Taylor, 2012), we construct the financial institution’s average leverage ratio 
and then multiply it by the relative size of a firm to construct our last systemic risk measure, 
RELLR. Giglio et al. (2016) argue that leverage for the financial institutions captures the 
instability in the sector. As they did not find a robust relationship between the average leverage 
of the top 20 largest financial institutions and macroeconomic activities, we substitute the 




Taylor (2012) have proved the relationship between average leverage of entire financial sector 
with GDP, we believe, therefore, that it might be a better measure of instability and can employ 
it to construct the variable RELLR. Again, a larger firm is more stable in an unstable 
environment and a negative sign of RELLR is expected.    
3.3. Summary statistics 
All the data are weighted equally every firm-quarter. This means every company has the same 
weight of information, which implies that the distribution can be greatly affected by relatively 
small firms. In addition, the cross-section and time series will have effects on the selected 
variables’ distributions.  
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
Table 1 summarises the properties of selected prediction variables. The leverage of failed firms 
is relatively high; the given mean leverage is 70.1% and the median is 78.9%. This is consistent 
with our expectation that a higher leverage ratio indicates that the firm is more likely to go 
bankrupt (Ohlson, 1980). The mean of NITA is lower than the median of NITA, showing that 
the distribution of profitability is negatively skewed. This reveals more unprofitable firms than 
profitable ones, but the gap between median and mean is not large in NITA. Comparing Panels 
A, B and C, it is obvious that failed firms have differences from non-failed firms. Their NITA 
is lower than that of non-failed firms, making a mean (median) annual loss of 6.7% (7.8%). 
The mean working capital over total assets is 9.1%, lower than non-failed firms, and the median 
is actually negative. The failed firms also have smaller relative sizes compared with non-failed 
firms. They also experience a very significant negative return relative to the past three months’ 
return, having a mean of -32.9% and a median of -41.1%, whereas non-failed and entire firms 
have a mean value that is no less than -6.6% and a median of no less than -1.8%. The log value 
of the price of a failed firm is also small, being 0.388 on mean and 0.000 on the median value, 
which is a very low level compared with a non-failed firm. For FMVOL, failed firms have 
larger relative equity volatility concerning financial sector volatility. Failed firms have smaller 





3.4. Baseline model specification 
Over the past decades, several earlier prediction models have been introduced, such as the Z-
score model proposed by Altman (1968), the O-score model proposed by Ohlson (1980), and 
Merton’s (1974) distance to default measure. Recent studies are more based on a logistic 
regression model, as it is a conventionally preferred technique for modelling a firm’s 
bankruptcy risks where the dependent variable is binary (see, Ohlson, 1980; Shumway, 2001; 
Chava and Jarrow, 2004; Campbell et al., 2008). The logit model is superior to the alternatives, 
such as the Cox-Hazard model, in predicting binary outcomes using interval-censored data 
(Bauer and Agarwal, 2014; Gupta et al., 2018). A logit model has one essential advantage. 
Unlike the linear regression model, a logit model does not assume a linear relationship between 
independent variables and the probability of bankruptcy. Instead, it describes the relationship 
between independent variables and log odds ratio, which has very good interpretability. When 
predicting an individual firm, the logit model can output a simple percentage result, which is 
convenient and comfortable in practice. Shumway (2001) also shows that a logit model is a 
‘dynamic’ model, which allows for time-varying covariates and can be regarded as a hazard 
model. The estimation of coefficients also shows the robustness. Therefore, following 
Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004), and Campbell et al. (2008), we employ a logistic 
regression model for our empirical analysis. 
The definition of bankruptcy that we adopt is the definition used by Agarwal and Taffler (2008), 
in which a failed firm is defined as delisted for certain reasons according to what the CRSP 
delisting code specifies. The sample outcome is either 0 (non-failed) or 1 (failed) in one firm-
quarter, which is a binary dependent variable. The probability that bankruptcy of firm i occurs 
at time t is denoted by Pr = 1|
 = 
, where x′ is a vector representing a collection 
of k independent variables, x(1,it), x(2,it)… x(k,it). Let g(x′) denote a linear regression of x(k,it). 
It can be expressed as: 
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where α and βk are unknown parameters to be estimated. The dependent variables are given 
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which also can be expressed as:  
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Given that the relationship between 
′  and x(k,it) is non-linear, an odds ratio, 
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             (6) 
where x(k, it) denotes the k-th independent variables of the firm i at time t.  
This paper uses function (6) as the ultimate model. To estimate the variables’ coefficients, we 
can use maximum likelihood estimation, which involves obtaining the coefficient values by 
maximising the agreement between the logit model and the observations. Alpha gives the log 
value when all the variables are zero; beta means the change of log value when the variable 
increases by one unit and all other variables remain constant.  
4. Empirical Analysis  
4.1. First-stage: systemic risk measures and bankruptcy 
The first part of our empirical analysis is designed in order to do a preliminary test and to 




of a nonfinancial firm going bankrupt. Systemic risk measures9 are calculated based on the 
financial sector’s market information; thus, higher frequency data is preferable for pursuing 
this problem. However, due to the limitation of date information, we are only able to do the 
first-stage analysis by testing a sub-sample from our whole sample, which has 83,795 firm-
month observations from January 2000 to January 2012. The measures are lagged for one 
month as a nonfinancial firm may respond slowly to systemic risk (e.g., Linn and Weagley, 
2018). In the period from January 2000 to January 201210 , we examined the relationship 
between 21 systemic risk measures and nonfinancial firms’ bankruptcy using a simple logit 
model, function (7):  
ln 2 3*+453*+46 = α + 
                         (7) 
where x(it) denotes the independent variables (i.e., systemic risk measures) of the firm i at time 
t. The majority of systemic risk measures were calculated by Giglio et al. (2016) and we use a 
similar collection to the one that Giglio et al. (2016) use, where systemic risk measures are 
categorised into institution-specific risk and liquidity, co-movement and contagion, volatility 
and instability, credit condition and others not covered by Giglio et al. (2016). Additionally, we 
also wonder whether shocks in the financial sector can indicate bankruptcy in a nonfinancial 
firm. We measure shocks by simply taking the difference of systemic risk level between the 
previous month and the current month (Delta). Larger positive shocks are assumed to be 
associated with firm-level bankruptcy probability, and vice versa.     
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
Column Var in Table 2 illustrates the coefficients of systemic risk measures as a univariate 
independent variable after logistic regression. Systemic risk measures in each category show a 
significant association with firm bankruptcy, except for DCI, intl. spill-over, book lvg, and TED 
spr. All the significant measures have a positive sign, with only WFS showing a negative sign. 
As known in general, a larger asset-liability maturities mismatch makes financial institutions 
                                                        
9 See Appendix Table A.1a for the systemic risk measures in detail.  
10 The sample exceptions are January 2000 to January 2010 for the measurement of GZ and January 2000 to September 




more vulnerable to liquidity risk. WSF, an alternative measure that relates to liquidity risk as 
well, should be expected to have a positive sign. The negative sign on WSF is therefore contrary 
to our expectation. We find evidence to explain this in the literature that US banks behave 
differently to others regarding short-term wholesale funding (López-Espinosa et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, we believe this abnormal sign can be explained by the research conducted by 
Dewally and Shao (2014). In their research, they find that wholesale funding has been gradually 
increasing since before 2007–2009, and dropped significantly during the financial crisis. This 
trend is opposite to the probability of firm bankruptcy. Theoretically, they argue that liquidity 
shocks in wholesale sale funding markets lead to contraction of bank credit, and consequently 
do harm to their borrowers. Therefore, it is a sign of liquidity risk shocks when banks 
dramatically decrease the use of short-term wholesale funding meaning that firms are more 
likely to go bankrupt due to the reduced credit supply. Column Delta in Table 2 shows that 
some of the deltas of financial systemic risk are positively related to bankruptcy, but are not as 
strong as the original systemic measures. This implies that the change in systemic risk does not 
show constant or better predictability than the systemic risk measures themselves. In particular, 
the volatility measure, which has been widely used as a reliable measure of systemic risk (e.g., 
Linn and Weagley, 2018), shows a positive and significant association with firm bankruptcy in 
our sample.  
The results support the view, such as that stated by Giglio et al. (2016), that ‘financial sector 
equity volatility is the most useful individual predictors in macroeconomic downturns’, while 
in our context, it is one of the most useful individual predictors of nonfinancial firm bankruptcy. 
Many studies have been studying the relationship between volatility and macroeconomic 
activities and have shown their deep ties. Chauvet et al. (2015) also reached similar conclusions. 
This suggests that our hypothesis, as well as results, are supported by the literature. It also 
supports us in constructing our novel variables from a theoretical background.    
Although most of the systemic risk measures tested in this paper are significantly positive when 
related to bankruptcy, we will not combine all the existing measures into one when we construct 




provide information about volatility, instability and credit conditions, because measures in 
these categories show relatively significant and reasonable predictability in macroeconomic 
downturns (Giglio et al., 2016), and thus might be better used for bankruptcy predictions. These 
categories are financial sector volatility (volatility measure), financial institutions average 
leverage ratio (instability measure) and default spread (credit condition measure).   
4.2. Second-stage: the use of systemic risk information in prediction 
In the second-stage analysis, we construct our models based on the results in the first-stage 
analysis. We test each model in this section using the full sample, which consists of 8,604 listed 
nonfinancial companies on the US stock market at any time between 2000 Q1 and 2016 Q4.  
4.2.1. Incorporating systemic risk information into previous studies 
This paper estimates the models developed by Shumway (2001) and Campbell et al. (2008) 
and tests their performance when incorporating proposed the systemic risk measures of 
FMVOL, RELVOL, CLDEF, and RELLR. The aim is to test the validity of the previously 
proposed models’ performance under the current dataset and to test the contribution and 
limitation of our systemic risk measures to their models11. Note that we excluded SIGMA when 
incorporating the systemic risk variables as they could also be alternative measures. Table 3 
presents the estimated coefficients of the three models with the current dataset as well as when 
adding systemic risk measures.  
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
First, when compared with the previous studies’ own estimation, it can be seen that all the 
variables’ coefficients estimated using our full sample have the same sign. However, the 
absolute values of previous and current results that the same model gives are quite different. 
This suggests that, although there are various estimates of the probability of bankruptcy, the 
models still produce similar estimates of the relative bankruptcy risk of the firm in different 
periods. Recent studies have shown the same conclusion (e.g., Agarwal and Taffler, 2008; 
                                                        
11 The Internet Appendix reports the correlation matrix of variables used by Shumway (2001) and Campbell et al. (2008) 




Gregory et al., 2010). In addition, it can be concluded that the predictors that previous models 
have employed are consistent across time, models, markets and the observation period (yearly, 
quarterly or monthly).  
A notable exception in Panel C is that the coefficient of RELSIZE that Campbell et al. (2008, 
p. 2,910) estimated has a positive sign, but is negative in the current paper. Campbell et al. 
(2008) argue that the inclusion of price per share results in an ad hoc correction to the negative 
effect of price. However, in this paper, once price per share is included there is no opposite sign 
on RELSIZE. The correlation coefficient between RELSIZE and PRICE is 0.73, which shows 
that there might be a strong relationship between them. However, it is a positive correlation. 
We argue that the previous articles used original calculated ratios and data, whereas this paper, 
uses the winsorised data. Winsorised data can limit the effect of undesirable outliers such as 
extreme values in the dataset. If more data were included, the effects of market impacts would 
become stronger and the effects of accounting impacts would become slightly weaker, yet there 
is a slightly different effect (Campbell et al., 2008). The cause of the differences between the 
present estimates; results and the previous results from the literature might be because of the 
impacts of the winsorised data. However, it can be concluded that the accounting and market 
data that the present paper employs are powerful, and that the relative risk of a firm that these 
predictors indicate is consistent with the previous studies.  
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
The present paper also investigates the effects of incorporating our proposed systemic risk 
measures into previously proposed models. The model proposed by Shumway (2001) and 
Campbell et al. (2008) are the representatives of classic accounting-only models and market-
accounting-based models, respectively. Table 3 (Panels A, B and C) suggests that the systemic 
risk measures that are simply incorporated into previous models show statistically significant 
and expected coefficient signs. It reveals that the systemic risk measures we propose have 
information about firm bankruptcy. SIGMA is excluded when we incorporate systemic risk 
variables because we argue that there might be potential multicollinearity between market 




link systemic risk measures and individual firms together, our proposed variables contain both 
systemic risk information and firm characteristics. The incorporation of systemic risk measures 
is useful in bankruptcy prediction. Evidence can also be seen in Figure 1, where the significant 
increase in areas under ROC (AUC) when systemic risk measures are included confirms the 
finding. This suggests that the use of systemic risk information enhances the ability of the 
previously proposed prediction models, particularly when combined with a pure accounting 
model (Shumway, 2001), which shows the greatest improvement. 
4.2.2. The Accounting, Market and Systemic Risk (AMS) model 
Given the results discussed, we propose an AMS model to predict nonfinancial firm bankruptcy, 
which combines accounting-information-based variables, market information-based variables 
and financial sector systemic risk measures together. We maximise the utility of systemic risk 
in individual firm bankruptcy predictions and expect the AMS model to have better 
predictability than the accounting market only models in US firm bankruptcy predictions. The 
other models, Model A to Model F, are comparison models. Model A is an accounting-
variables-only model; Model B is a market variables-only model; Model C is a systemic risk 
measures only model; Model D is an accounting and systemic risk measures model; Model E 
is a market and systemic risk measures model; and Model F is an accounting variables and 
market variables model. Table 4 illustrates the results from seven logit regressions of the firm 
bankruptcy indicators on the predictor variables. 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
In Table 4, all the estimated coefficients of variables in seven models are significant at the 1% 
significance level and with the expected sign. It can be concluded that all the models’ 
estimations are efficient predictors of the probability of firm bankruptcy. The estimates of 
predictors from each model are quite different; for example, WCTA is estimated to be -2.5658 
from Model A, whereas it is -0.9030 from the AMS model. This suggests that the absolute risks 
of firms differ widely across the models, although the relative risk is quite consistent. The AMS 
model can be regarded as a simple combination of Model A, Model B and Model C. All the 




suggesting that the selected variables are informative and statistically useful indicators between 
the models. The inclusion of systemic risk measures changes the coefficients of the common 
variables to a slight degree. However, the sign of common variables’ coefficients is consistent 
among models. In the AMS model, RELSIZE, RELVOL and RELLR all have negative signs. 
It suggests that, apart from the fact that relative size has a negative relationship with bankruptcy, 
the interaction of relative size and systemic risk measures intensifies the relationship. It also 
means that a larger firm can better defend against systemic volatility and instability than a 
smaller one.  
One argument is that larger firms tend to show risk-averse management, while smaller firms 
tend to be managed more by people who love taking risks, and thus always face the problem 
of overinvestment. During a period of high systemic risk, larger firms are more likely to benefit 
from ‘underinvesting’. This implies that firm size weakens the positive effects of systemic risk 
on bankruptcy. The signs of estimated coefficients of FMVOL and CLDEF are as we expected. 
The negative sign of FMVOL suggests that if a firm has higher equity volatility than financial 
sector equity volatility, its probability of bankruptcy will increase. One explanation is that the 
firm is facing more risk than the systemic risk would otherwise indicate. For CLDEF, the 
explanation is that debts in current liabilities make a firm more vulnerable when systemic risk 
arises. We would argue that adverse credit conditions in the financial market increase the 
probability of a firm going bankrupt as the cost of debts increases, especially when the debts 
are with a floating rate. Although the statistics of both Pseudo R-square and LR Chi-square 
tests increased after incorporating the macroeconomic variable, the results are still not robust 
and trustworthy enough to conclude that our hypothesis is correct. In later sections, further 
discussion will be made to conclude. 
4.2.3. Long-horizon prediction  
In practice, risk managers are required to use the data available at the time of the analysis. 
However, a firm’s bankruptcy date is not known, and data for predictions are not updated daily. 
Furthermore, shorter period prediction does not give time for related institutions or individuals 




bankruptcy prediction models generally experiences a decline with the earlier horizon 
(Campbell et al., 2008). It is interesting to whether our models’ prediction is still accurate with 
longer horizons. Accordingly, this paper estimates firm bankruptcy in n quarters prior to the 
observation of a firm going bankrupt12.  
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
Table 5 illustrates the results in a two-quarter prediction. Compared to Table 4, the coefficients 
and significance fit statistics decline as predicting horizon prolonged 13 . In detail, all the 
variables remain statistically significant at the 1% level. This indicates that our models retain 
predictability in long-term predictions. The liquidity variable, WCTA, has a coefficient that 
decays slowly with the horizon, suggesting that the liquidity of a firm is a constant indicator 
during the two quarters. The coefficient of profitability, NITA, shows an increase as predicting 
horizon prolonged, indicating that profitability is more important in longer period predictions. 
The coefficients of TLTA show relatively faster declines with the horizon. The same declining 
trend and rate also can be seen on EXRET, PRICE, FMVOL and CLDEF, suggesting these 
variables are primarily shorter-term indicators of firm bankruptcy. One point to be noticed is 
that RELSIZE’s coefficient shows a dramatic decline, with significance down to 5% level, 
which suggests a relative firm size is not as important as other variables in long-term 
predictions. Surprisingly, relatively to predictions in t, RELVOL and RELLR’s coefficients see 
an increase in t-1 and t-2, respectively14. This suggests that, compared with other predictors, 
although firm relative size loses predictability in the longer term, it plays a relatively more 
significant role in a longer prediction when related to systemic risk. Overall, variables within 
models become less important as the prediction horizon becomes longer. In Table 5, the number 
of observations sees a downward trend with the horizon. It is caused by declining observations 
at the two sides of the dataset that are driven by an increasing horizon. A failed firm in first n 
quarter cannot be related to the condition of the firm n quarters previously. The most recent 
period of the failed firm cannot be used to predict bankruptcy. However, the trend is in line 
                                                        
12 See Appendix 2. 
13 Note we do not report the results of one-quarter prediction here since they can see the same trends as two-quarter 
predition shows. However, they are presented in the Internet Appendix. 




with previous evidence (Campbell et al., 2008).    
5. Model Evaluation  
In this section, the seven firm bankruptcy prediction models are tested to evaluate the models’ 
performance. The present paper first discusses the marginal effects of each variable in the AMS 
model and then presents the results of seven models of predictive power measures. Finally, a 
further robustness check is provided to test the goodness-of-fit of the proposed model. 
5.1. Marginal effects 
The coefficients of predictors in the binary model are hard to interpret directly. Although 
logistic regression models’ estimates can be explained by using their odds ratios, the 
information from the odds ratio is ‘static’. The odds ratio cannot adequately describe the 
changing effects that variables have on binary outcomes. Previous studies have mostly focused 
on the overall predictability and the interpretation of each variable merely relies on the 
coefficient sign, while we also provide marginal effect analysis. 
[Insert Table 6 and Figure 2 around here] 
Table 6 presents the impacts of predictors on dependent variables. The sign of each variable is 
by logit regression estimates in terms of relative changes in direction, which confirm previous 
conclusions. In Model A, Model D, Model E and the AMS model, NITA has the largest 
marginal impact in absolute terms. However, we are more interested in the marginal effects of 
systemic risk measures. When comparing FMVOL, RELVOL, CLDEF and RELLR in each 
model that includes these four variables, RELLR has the smallest importance ceteris paribus; 
this is because the variable has a higher level of magnitude than other variables. Figure 2 shows 
the predictive margins at different values of each predictive variable in which other variables 
are constant. The upside or downside slope of the variables again confirms the positive or 
negative relationship between variables and bankruptcy. For example, the downside slope of 
RELVOL indicates it is negatively associated with firm bankruptcy. Interestingly, the slopes of 
our systemic risk measures are even steeper than conventional accounting and market variables 




greater impact on bankruptcy prediction than marginal effects suggest. However, the magnitude 
of each variable is not the same which can explain the phenomenon. The marginal effects of 
each variable in the AMS model are presented in the Internet Appendix, which confirms the 
relatively weak effect of RELLR. 
5.2. Model predictive power 
The measures of predictive power test how well a model can predict the dependent variable 
based on independent variables (Allison, 2014). The area under Receiver Operating 
Characteristics (ROC) curve, Rank-order correlations coefficients and R-square measures are 
often used. Table 7 includes the model predictive power statistics for the seven models. Panels 
A and B show measures for the seven models in t and t-2, respectively. The area under the ROC 
curve method is employed in the present paper to evaluate the model’s performance. The ROC 
curve is a widely used tool in the field of signal detection theory, psychology, and particularly 
in medicine (Engelmann et al., 2003). Researchers found that it is also a well-established tool 
to validate bankruptcy prediction models (e.g., Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Agarwal and Taffler, 
2008; Bauer and Agarwal 2013). AUC is the value of the area under the ROC curve15, which 
is a primarily used measure in the logistic regression predictive ability tests. It is shows that 
the AMS model has the most powerful predictability. The coefficients’ significant level shows 
a decline when the prediction horizons grow, and the predictive power of each model 
experiences a decline in the meantime. However, our AMS model still shows a relatively 
prominent level of predictive power as the AUC is over 0.90 even in t-2 period prediction. This 
paper uses the Gini rank coefficient as a rank-order correlations measure. Engelmann et al. 
(2003) also argued that AUC contains similar information to the Gini rank coefficient and it is 
a transformed format of the area under the ROC curve, which is (AUC-0.50)*2. This method 
is unbiased and robust, and is employed in the present paper to evaluate models. Our pseudo 
R-square includes several widely accepted measures. Cox and Snell’s R-square is a measure 
based on the log-likelihood of the model. Nagelkerke’s R-square and Efron’s R-square are 
refined versions of Cox and Snell’s R-square. These measures have a similar interpretation to 
                                                        





linear regression as they measure the significance of models16. The models’ Chi-square tests 
are also presented, where the degrees of freedom for each model are 3 for Models A and B, 4 
for Model C, 7 for Models D and E, 6 for Model F, and 10 for the AMS model. 
[Insert Table 7 around here] 
The measures of the seven models are agreed in the relative predictive power of each model, 
which enable us to conclude the following. Comparing Model A, Model B and Model C in 
period t prediction (Panel A), the predictability rank, from low to high, is Model A, Model C 
and Model B, which suggests that, in our models, market variables include more information 
than systemic variables in bankruptcy prediction, and accounting variables have the least 
information. The findings are consistent with the results in Table 2: that a systemic risk measure 
only model only can predict firm bankruptcy. Furthermore, Model C performed better than 
Shumway’s (2001) accounting-only model according to the predictive power tests. The 
statistical differences between Model A and Model D suggest that simply incorporating 
systemic risk measures into the accounting variables model can improve its performance. The 
same improvement can be seen from Model B to Model E as well as from Model F to the AMS 
model. Again, the same improvements were also noted in the longer horizon predictions (e.g. 
in t-2). Even with the same dataset, the AMS model performed better than the previous models 
proposed by Shumway (2001) and Campbell et al. (2008), given that the AUC of the AMS 
model dominates other’s models. If compared vertically, each model shows a decline in 
predictability as horizons prolong, which was also shown in the work of Campbell et al. (2008). 
In each panel, the proposed AMS model performs better in terms of the predictive ability which 
dominates the other models. The findings indicate that the incorporation of proposed systemic 
risk measures in a bankruptcy prediction model can increase the model’s predictive accuracy. 
The AMS model is therefore a powerful tool for predicting bankruptcy of US firms.  
5.3. Goodness-of-fit tests 
Predictive power measures only are not informative enough to be used to accept a model, 
                                                        




although they are often used (Long and Freese, 2014). A scalar measure of goodness-of-fit can 
be useful when comparing models as they answer the question as to whether the model is 
consistent with the data. Conventional goodness-of-fit tests for logistic regression models are 
clustering in Deviance and Pearson’s Chi-squared tests, but their drawbacks drive us to reject 
them. Deviance and Pearson’s Chi-squared tests are used when cases can be aggregated as 
profiles, and they perform well ‘when the expected number of both events and non-events for 
each profile is at least 5’, as Allison (2014) states. However, he argues that aggregation is often 
impossible when predictors are not categorised. The AMS model contains ten continuous 
predictors which cannot meet the requirements of Deviance and Pearson’s Chi-squared tests. 
Furthermore, he is also concerned that these tests are not particularly powerful. Therefore, this 
paper employs Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and 
Standardised Pearson17 as goodness-of-fit tests which do not need to group cases into profiles. 
Both AIC and BIC are information measures, and the Standardised Pearson test is 
recommended by Allison (2014). For all the goodness-of-fit tests used in this paper, the smaller 
the statistics are, the better a model performs. Table 7 also illustrates the statistics of models in 
period t and t-2 predictions. Consistent with the predictive power tests, the results further 
confirm the utility of systemic risk information and the superiority of the AMS model in 
goodness-of-fit terms, as well as the declining trend in long-horizon prediction.  
[Insert Table 8 around here] 
We also checked the robustness of AMS model as measured by the Hosmer-Lemeshow (1980) 
statistic. It is another approach which is often used as an additional tool to check the goodness-
of-fit. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test is a decile approach that its estimation tests the bankruptcy 
prediction ability of a model, from which actual probabilities of bankruptcy could be inferred 
(once the coefficients of the logit model are estimated). Table 8 presents the results of the 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test, which suggests that the observed and expected number of the failed 
firms in each decile are close and are statistically accepted at a significant level.  
                                                        




Overall, 91.39% of the bankrupt firms were predicted correctly by our AMS model. In the 
highest probability deciles, 89.52% of the bankrupt firms were predicted correctly, while in the 
lowest five deciles of probability (decile 1–5), only 0.11% of the firms were reported as a 
misclassification. Note that the p-value Hosmer-Lemeshow measures in Table 8 respectively 
is below 0.05, which suggests a rejection of the AMS model. However, this can be ignored as 
Allison (2014) argues that it may be impossible to find a model with an acceptable p-value 
when the sample size is so large (the sample size of the present paper is 225,813 observations). 
To recap, the facts discussed above indicate that the models have a very high level of goodness-
of-fit and further confirm the reliability of the AMS model.   
5.4. Prediction with monthly and yearly observation intervals 
Market variables, including systemic risk measures, contain more information in higher 
frequency data. Market-based models benefit more in prediction using higher frequency data 
than using lower frequency data (e.g., Merton, 1974). Systemic risk measures are mostly 
constructed based on market information, and thus stronger effects are expected in higher 
frequency data. For example, lower frequency data smooths out volatility which might omit 
important information. Therefore, to maximise the use of systemic risk variables in bankruptcy 
prediction, we test our models based on a monthly observation interval with variables 
constructed with monthly data18. For robustness concerns, we also provide a test using yearly 
observation intervals19. Our AMS model performs well in both sub-tests, except for the variable 
RELLR, which became insignificant in the monthly sample test. We argue that RELLR is 
constructed based on the accounting ratio in the financial sector; thus it is acceptable for it to 
become insignificant in higher frequency data based predictions.  
6. Concluding Remarks 
Financial systemic risk is taking root in both academia and practitioners in the aftermath of the 
GFC. We have contributed to the understanding of this recent and increasingly popular concept 
by investigating the value of financial systemic risk measures in predicting the bankruptcy rates 
                                                        
18 In the Internet Appendix, we illustrate the coefficients of predictors with 83,795 monthly observations, which cover the 
period from January 2000 to January 2012. 




of nonfinancial firms. Our sample is arguably the most representative, comprehensive and 
updated sample in the current extant literature, which includes 225,813 firm-quarter 
observations of 8,604 listed firms on the US stock market from 2000 Q1 to 2016 Q4.  
Motivated by the very significant and robustly positive relationship between one-quarter lagged 
financial sector equity volatility (and to a less extent, the other financial systemic risk measures) 
and the contemporaneous bankruptcy rate of nonfinancial firms, we carefully incorporated 
additional explanatory variables with sensible economic/financial motivations to the prevalent 
bankruptcy prediction models. We have found several new model specifications that have 
higher explanatory power than the extant state-of-the-art model specifications proposed by 
Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004) and Campbell et al. (2008); and hence, their 
seminal earlier counterparts such as Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980). We find substantial 
accuracy benefits from combining financial systemic risk measures and an individual firm’s 
characteristics as predictors. These benefits are incremental and significant, even when we 
relax our restrictions on contemporaneous forecasts and turn to prediction within longer 
horizons of one or two quarters. The performance of all the models under our scrutiny 
deteriorated, but our proposed model still shows superior predictability of firm bankruptcy 
relative to the conventional accounting and market-based models, whether in a one-quarter-
ahead prediction or a two-quarter-ahead prediction. Finally, our proposed model outperformed 
the extant models in several forms of model evaluations, such as marginal effects and model 
predictive power, as well as many goodness-of-fit tests. Overall, we conclude that financial 
sector systemic risk is incrementally useful in predicting the bankruptcy of nonfinancial firms. 
We have called our newly proposed methodology the Accounting, Market and Systemic Risk 
(AMS) model, since it includes accounting ratios and market variables as well as systemic risk 
measures.  
Practitioners could employ our models to predict the potential bankruptcy risk of a firm in 
advance and to take timely measures to prevent or reduce unexpected loss in the future. To 
achieve this goal, several findings may be taken into account. First, we find that relatively large 




conditions than smaller ones. Second, when firms have higher equity volatility than financial 
sector equity volatility, the probability of bankruptcy will increase. Finally, an adverse credit 
condition in the financial market increases the probability of bankruptcy as the cost of debts 
increases (especially the floating-rate debts).  
There are several caveats to our study. Ideally, we should build our systemic risk measures on 
economic theory to capture the causality from one industry to another. In the absence of such 
a generally accepted theory, we selectively combined some financial systemic risk measures 
with sensible economic/financial motivation and individual firm’s characteristics as predictors. 
Some systemic risk measures suffer from data availability constraints, and we are no longer 
able to update these, since they were constructed using proprietary sources that have stopped 
making their data available (e.g., the credit spread measure proposed by Gilchrist and Zakrajsek 
(2012)). There might be more and better systemic risk measures in existence, and even our 
proposed systemic risk measures might be used in a better way. We have followed the 
mainstream literature and have focused on the financial sector, but we do not exclude the 
possibility that some other sector(s) may be as systemically important, or more important, than 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
This table includes the following variables (see details in data description section): TLTA (total liabilities/total assets), NITA (net income/total assets), WCTA (working 
capital/total assets), RELSIZE (log[firm market capitalisation to market capitalisation of S&P 500 index]), EXRET (return on the firm-value-weighted CRSP NYSE and AMEX 
index), PRICE (log value of price per share winsorised above $15), FMVOL (firm equity volatility/average equity volatility of 20 largest financial institution), RELVOL (relative 
size*average equity volatility of 20 largest financial institution), CLDEF (debt in current liabilities in hundred $*default spread) and RELLR (relative size*financial institution 
average market leverage ratio). Panels A, B and C show summary statistics for all firm-quarter observations, non-failed firm-quarter observations and failed firm-quarter 
observations, respectively. There are 225,813 observations, of which 1,690 failed, while the remaining 224,123 did not fail. 
 TLTA NITA WCTA RELSIZE EXRET PRICE FMVOL RELVOL CLDEF RELLR 
Panel A: Total Data Set (Observations: 225,813) 
Mean 0.481 -0.006 0.257 -10.181 -0.064 2.067 2.089 -0.181 0.789 -92.754 
Median 0.476 0.007 0.224 -10.186 -0.019 2.625 1.794 -0.151 0.025 -90.89 
Std. Dev. 0.231 0.043 0.232 2.001 0.243 0.862 1.138 0.088 1.914 24.685 
Min 0.114 -0.121 -0.086 -13.541 -0.657 0.000 0.678 -0.367 0.000 -155.699 
Max 0.938 0.045 0.716 -6.568 0.279 2.708 5.093 -0.085 7.638 -55.411 
Panel B: Non-Failed Firm Group (Observations: 224,123) 
Mean 0.479 -0.005 0.258 -10.16 -0.062 2.080 2.075 -0.180 0.789 -92.502 
Median 0.475 0.008 0.226 -10.167 -0.018 2.638 1.786 -0.150 0.025 -90.674 
Std. Dev. 0.230 0.043 0.231 1.992 0.241 0.850 1.126 0.087 1.914 24.522 
Panel C: Failed Group Firm (Observations: 1,690) 
Mean 0.701 -0.067 0.091 -12.889 -0.329 0.388 3.929 -0.267 0.799 -126.182 
Median 0.789 -0.078 -0.031 -13.541 -0.411 0.000 4.282 -0.277 0.039 -129.943 




Table 2. Systematic risk measures and bankruptcy   
This table presents the bankruptcy forecast results with the 21 systemic risk measures, all of which are extracted directly 
from the work of Giglio et al. (2016)a, except for CES (Banulescu and Dumitrescu, 2015) and WSF (López-Espinosa et al., 
(2012). The dependent variable is whether or not a US nonfinancial firm went bankrupt. The sample consists of 83,795 firm-
month observations covering the period from Jan 2000 to Jan 2012, except for the GZ measurement (Jan 2000 to Jan 2010) 
and the intl. spill-over measure (Jan 2000 to Sep 2010). WFS is calculated quarterly and converted to monthly observations 
by assuming that it changes arithmetically between quarters. All the measures lagged for a month in the forecast. Colum Var 
reports the coefficient of variable in the univariate estimation and Column Delta reports the coefficient of change of systemic 
risk with respect to previous month. * denotes p-value that p<0.10; ** denotes p-value that p<0.05; *** denotes that p-value 
p<0.01. 
Category Variable Column Var z   Column Delta   z 
Institution-specific 
risk & Liquidity 
CoVaR 13.870*** (4.64) 49.930** (3.06) 
Δ CoVaR 15.860** (2.74) 86.150** (3.15) 
MES 6.148** (3.15) 42.340*** (3.32) 
SRISK 10.670* (2.14) -1.631 (-0.14) 
AIM 43.840** (5.09) -10.400 (-0.94) 
Comovement & 
Contagion 
Absorption 2.351*** (3.89) 3.337 (1.54) 
Δ Absorption 1.744** (2.80) 0.969 (1.71) 
 DCI -0.405 (-0.75) -1.307 (-0.79) 
 Intl. spillover -0.001 (-0.27) 0.048*** (3.75) 
Volatility & 
Instability 
Volatility 14.610*** (5.64) -5.366 (3.09) 
CatFin 5.614*** (5.76) 4.503* (2.00) 
 Turbulence 0.003** (2.71) -0.002** (-2.63) 
 Book lvg. -1.796 (-0.40) -24.640 (-1.00) 
 Mkt lvg. 0.019* (1.98) 0.111** (2.75) 
 Size conc 0.203* (2.01) -0.372 (-0.62) 
Credit condition TED spr. 0.001 (0.95) -0.004* (-2.32) 
 Term spr. 0.071* (2.28) -0.302* (-2.30) 
 Default spr. 0.277*** (4.06) 0.387 (1.35) 
 GZ 0.192*** (7.29) 0.162* (1.02) 
Measures not 
covered in Giglio 
et al. (2016) 
CES 22.170*** (4.30) 118.4455*** (3.19) 
WSF -6.657*** (-3.69) -31.25* (-2.47) 




Table 3. Incorporating systemic risk variables into previous studies 
Panels A, B and C present the estimated coefficients from three previously proposed models using the current dataset and coefficient results from previous studies (Sources from: (i) Table 2 
(Shumway, 2001, p. 117), (ii) Model 1, Table 3, (Campbell et al., 2008, p. 2,910), and (iii) Model 2, Table 3 (ibid.)). The variables are winsorised at the 5% and 95% levels. + denotes at 0.01 
significance level. 
Panel A:  
Variables WCTA RETA EBITTA METL STA    FMVOL RELVOL CLDEF RELLR Constant 
Shumway (2001) -2.9349+ -0.4980+ -19.2328+ -0.1900+ 0.9255+        -4.7292+ 
+ Systemic risk -2.1677+ -0.1535+ -8.8930+ -0.0717+ 0.0550    0.7174+ -6.5145+ 0.2926+ -0.0249+ -11.0698+ 
Panel B: 
Variables NITA TLTA EXRET SIGMA RELSIZE    FMVOL RELVOL CLDEF RELLR Constant 
Campbell et al. (2008) 
Model 1 
-6.237+ 2.9868+ -1.1614+ 36.5076+ -0.6841+        -17.0680+ 
+ Systemic risk a -6.7309+ 2.5931+ -1.1214+  -0.5351+    0.5676+ -5.1330+ 0.3222+ -0.0125+ -17.5975+ 
Panel C: 
Variables NIMTA TLMTA EXRET RELSIZE SIGMA CASHMTA MB PRICE FMVOL RELVOL CLDEF RELLR Constant 
Campbell et al. (2008) 
Model 2 
-13.2646+ 2.0152+ -0.8844+ -0.4079+ 27.2859+ -2.0971+ 0.1044+ -0.6947+     -11.9273+ 
+ Systemic risk b -12.6601+ 1.6715+ -0.9130+ -0.2518+  -1.8449+ 0.1077+ -0.6354+ 0.4710+ -4.0678+ 0.2401+ -0.0147+ -12.6700+ 





Table 4. Logit regression results  
This table reports the estimated coefficient results from seven logit regressons of bankruptcy prediction models. The absolute 
z statistics values are also reported under each coefficient. Model A is an accounting-variables-only model; Model B is a 
market variables-only model; Model C is a systemic risk variables-only model; Model D is an accounting and systemic risk 
variables model; Model E is a market and systemic risk variables model; Model F is an accounting variables and market 
variables model; while the AMS model is our proposed model that combines three sets of variables. The total number of 
observations is 225,813. All variables are winsorised at the 5% and 95% level. + denotes at 0.01 significance level. 
Variable Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F AMS model 
TLTA 2.1980+   2.2057+  2.1830+ 1.9869+ 
 (17.29)   (16.41)  (16.95) (14.79) 
NITA -21.2104+   -8.9166+  -6.4327+ -5.5015+ 
 (-47.82)   (-17.22)  (-12.55) (-10.33) 
WCTA -2.5658+   -1.1186+  -1.5061+ -0.9030+ 
 (-17.92)   (-7.49)  (-10.46) (-6.06) 
RELSIZE  -0.4144+   -0.2456+ -0.4748+ -0.2810+ 
  (-12.57)   (-6.25) (-14.37) (-7.08) 
EXRET  -1.4466+   -0.9214+ -1.0294+ -0.6745+ 
  (-27.68)   (-16.28) (-18.80) (-11.56) 
PRICE  -1.4597+   -1.1823+ -1.1089+ -0.9728+ 
  (-17.73)   (-14.99) (-13.37) (-12.03) 
FMVOL   0.9547+ 0.7145+ 0.5810+  0.4637+ 
   (43.45) (29.94) (22.33)  (17.12) 
RELVOL   -8.1672+ -6.6238+ -4.8009+  -4.2377+ 
   (-23.95) (-18.51) (-12.98)  (-11.19) 
CLDEF   0.3767+ 0.2478+ 0.3771+  0.2687+ 
   (25.30) (15.29) (22.36)  (15.00) 
RELLR   -0.0280+ -0.0268+ -0.0129+  -0.0131+ 
   (-18.52) (-17.58) (-7.57)  (-7.71) 
Constant -6.4208+ -8.4513+ -12.8847+ -12.9693+ -11.4817+ -10.7258+ -12.7582+ 
 (-65.84) (-19.22) (-78.70) (-65.16) (-24.58) (-23.31) (-26.19) 
Pseudo R2 0.200 0.283 0.289 0.344 0.343 0.342 0.377 






Table 5. Two quarters ahead forecast 
This table reports the estimated two-quarters ahead forecast results from logit regressions of the bankruptcy prediction model. 
Using data from two-quarters prior to the observation of firm bankruptcy (t-2), the models are examined in order to confirm 
their prediction ability. The total number of observations is 208,950. All variables are winsorised at 5% and 95% level. + 
denotes at 0.01 significance level. 
Variable Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F AMS model 
TLTA 1.6660+   1.9808+  1.8978+ 1.9039+ 
 (13.19)   (15.12)  (14.77) (14.53) 
NITA -19.6178+   -9.6750+  -7.7449+ -6.8412+ 
 (-43.27)   (-18.59)  (-14.59) (-12.61) 
WCTA -1.7160+   -1.0073+  -1.1101+ -0.8395+ 
 (-12.52)   (-7.13)  (-8.05) (-5.95) 
RELSIZE  -0.2921+   -0.0532 -0.3852+ -0.1096+ 
  (-10.61)   (-1.49) (-13.81) (-3.04) 
EXRET  -1.0379+   -0.7420+ -0.6730+ -0.4917+ 
  (-23.22)   (-15.11) (-14.12) (-9.62) 
PRICE  -1.1930+   -1.0419+ -0.9491+ -0.8855+ 
  (-13.73)   (-12.64) (-10.92) (-10.55) 
FMVOL   0.7227+ 0.5074+ 0.4368+  0.3326+ 
   (33.68) (21.62) (16.91)  (12.34) 
RELVOL   -7.0986+ -5.6374+ -4.2457+  -3.6980+ 
   (-20.79) (-15.92) (-11.49)  (-9.82) 
CLDEF   0.1893+ 0.0754+ 0.1889+  0.0924+ 
   (9.20) (3.34) (8.52)  (3.85) 
RELLR   -0.0234+ -0.0240+ -0.0147+  -0.0158+ 
   (-15.74) (-16.04) (-8.36)  (-8.93) 
Constant -6.0007+ -6.9607+ -10.9863+ -11.2203+ -8.4041+ -9.4927+ -10.0701+ 
 (-63.50) (-18.88) (-72.25) (-59.93) (-20.78) (-24.05) (-23.69) 
Pseudo R2 0.133 0.190 0.184 0.236 0.219 0.236 0.255 





Table 6. Marginal effects of predictors in models 
This table reports the marginal effects (%) for our seven models. This measure is designed to examine the expected changes 
in outcomes in response to marginal changes in predictor variables. Marginal effects are computed while keeping all other 
variables constant. + denotes at 0.01 significance level. 
Variable Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F AMS model 
TLTA 1.5524+   1.4176+  1.4589+ 1.2678+ 
NITA -14.9810+   -5.7307+  -4.2987+ -3.5104+ 
WCTA -1.8122+   -0.7190+  -1.0065+ -0.5762+ 
RELSIZE  -0.2910+   -0.1622+ -0.3173+ -0.1793+ 
EXRET  -1.0250+   -0.7806+ -0.7410+ -0.6208+ 
PRICE  -1.0159+   -0.6083+ -0.6879+ -0.4304+ 
FMVOL   0.6426+ 0.4592+ 0.3836+  0.2959+ 
RELVOL   -5.4971+ -4.2571+ -3.1699+  -2.7041+ 
CLDEF   0.2535+ 0.1593+ 0.2490+  0.1715+ 





Table 7. Model predictive power statistics and goodness-of-fit tests 
This table reports model predictive power statistics and the results from the model goodness-of-fit tests. Panels A and B show the 
information for the seven models in t and t-2 respectively. The model predictive power measures are the area under ROC (AUC), 
the Gini rank coefficient, Cox-Snell’s R2, Nagelkerke’s R2 and Efron’s R2. The models’ Chi-squared tests are also presented, where 
the degrees of freedom for each model are 3 for Models A and B, 4 for Model C, 7 for Models D and E, 6 for Model F, and 10 for 
the AMS model. The model goodness-of-fit tests include the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) and the Standardised Pearson. The relatively small values of the tests indicate a better goodness-of-fit of the model. 
Variable Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E Model F AMS model 
Panel A: performance in t.        
AUC 0.8483 0.9216 0.9180 0.9284 0.9378 0.9328 0.9420 
Gini rank coefficient 0.6966 0.8432 0.836 0.8568 0.8756 0.8656 0.884 
Cox-Snell’s R2 0.017 0.025 0.025 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.033 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.207 0.292 0.299 0.354 0.353 0.352 0.387 
Efron’s R2 0.054 0.064 0.083 0.123 0.113 0.116 0.146 
LR Chi2 (3, 3, 4, 7, 7, 6, 10) 3977.66 5634.05 5763.73 6858.33 6820.99 6809.68 7498.91 
(p-value) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
AIC 15942.686 14286.294 14158.615 13070.022 13107.360 13116.671 12435.437 
BIC -3940.680 -5597.072 -5714.423 -6772.034 -6734.696 -6735.713 -7375.637 
Standardised Pearson 33314.04 30452.41 31548.88 25196.11 26758.36 25146.37 22926.31 
Panel B: performance in t – 2.        
AUC 0.8192 0.8751 0.8738 0.8983  0.8949 0.899 0.9093 
Gini rank coefficient 0.6384 0.7502 0.7476 0.7966 0.7898 0.798 0.8186 
Cox-Snell’s R2 0.011 0.016 0.015 0.020 0.019 0.020 0.022 
Nagelkerke’s R2 0.138 0.196 0.190 0.244 0.227 0.244 0.263 
Efron’s R2 0.021 0.029 0.027 0.044 0.037 0.046 0.051 
LR Chi2 (3, 3, 4, 7, 7, 6, 10) 2397.09 3413.32 3304.48 4243.63 3948.54 4245.03 4595.75 
(p-value) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
AIC 15616.750 14600.517 14711.353 13778.206 14073.292 13774.810 13432.085 
BIC -2360.337 -3376.571 -3255.485 -4157.882 -3862.795 -4171.528 -4473.254 






Table 8. Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic for the AMS Model 
This table presents the results from Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic investigating the goodness-of-fit of the 
AMS model. The probabilities are calculated for each quarter and the firms are then grouped into deciles 
based on the bankruptcy probabilities. The number of bankruptcy firms in each decile for each quarter is 
aggregated over 2000 Q1 to 2016 Q4 and reported in the table. ‘Obs’ shows the actual observed number of 
failed firms, while ‘Exp’ shows the expected number of failed firms that have been predicted within each 
probability decile for the proposed model. ‘%’ indicates the frequency within the specified decile as a 
percentage of the total number of observations, while the last column, ‘Total’, presents the number of firm-
quarters of each decile. Group 1 represents firms with low predicted bankruptcy probabilities and Group 10 
represents firms with high predicted bankruptcy probabilities.  
Group Prob Obs % Exp % Total 
1 0.01% 5 0.30 1.1 0.07 22582 
2 0.01% 6 0.36 2.3 0.14 22581 
3 0.02% 2 0.12 3.6 0.21 22581 
4 0.03% 12 0.71 5.4 0.32 22582 
5 0.04% 16 0.95 8 0.47 22581 
6 0.07% 10 0.59 12.6 0.75 22581 
7 0.14% 30 1.78 22.5 1.33 22582 
8 0.34% 63 3.73 49.1 2.91 22581 
9 1.21% 110 6.51 148 8.76 22581 
10 89.52% 1436 84.97 1437.4 85.05 22581 
Total 91.39% 1690 100.00 1690 100.00 225813 
Number of observations = 225,813     
Hosmer-Lemeshow Chi2(8) = 53.32     
Prob > Chi2 = 0.0000     











Figure 1. Incorporating Systemic Risk Information into Models in Previous Studies 
This figure plots the area under ROC (AUC) of previous models proposed by Shumway (2001) and Campbell et al. (2008), 




Campbell et al. (2008)
Model 1
Campbell et al. (2008)
Model 2
Original 0.8671 0.9235 0.9391
















Figure 2. Changes in Predicted Probabilities 
This figure plots the vectors reflecting changes in the probability of a firm failing. The computation was made 
considering all variables included in our AMS model in t. Similar shapes are shown in the prediction period of t-1 





























Table A.1a. List of Systemic Risk Measures 
This table lists the set of systemic risk measures. 
Category Variable Description  
Institution-specific 
risk & Liquidity 
CoVaR Measuring individual financial company’s contribution, from Adrian 
and Brunnermeier (2011). 
Δ CoVaR - 
 MES Marginal Expected Shortfalls, from Acharya et al. (2017). 
 SRISK Systemic Risk, from Brownlees and Engle’s (2016). 
 AIM Illiquidity measure, from Aimhud (2002). 
Comovement & 
contagion 
Absorption Fraction of the financial system variance explained by the first 3 
principal components, from Kritzman et al. (2011).  
 Δ Absorption - 
 DCI Dynamic Causality Index, from Billio et al. (2012). 
 Intl. spillover International Spillover, from Diebold and Yilmaz (2009). 
Volatility & 
Instability   
 
Volatility Average equity volatility of 20 largest financial institutions.  
CatFin A VaR measure, from Allen et al. (2012).  
Turbulence Recent covariance relative to a longer-term covariance estimate, from 
Kritzman and Li (2010). 
 Book lvg. Average book leverage for 20 largest financial institutions. 
 Mkt lvg. Average market leverage for 20 largest financial institutions. 
 Size conc Size concentration in financial industry. 
Credit condition TED spr. LIBOR minus the T-bill rate. 
 Term spr. The slope of the Treasury yield curve.  
 Default spr. BAA bond yield minus AAA bond yield. 
 
GZ Credit spread measure, from Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012). 
Measures not 
covered in Giglio 
et al. (2016) 
CES Component Expected Shortfalls, from Banulescu and Dumitrescu 
(2015). 










Appendix 2. Probability of bankruptcy in the quarter n 
The likelihood of bankruptcy in the quarter n is assumed to be conditionally survival in the 
quarter n-1. This is given by (Campbell et al., 2008, page 2912 equation [4]):       
Pr" 8 = 1# 85 = 0% =  &'&()),*+&(,,,*+&⋯&(--,*+ . 
 
 
Table A.1b. List of Indicators of Bankruptcy 
This table lists the set of indicators along with their respective definition that we use for the empirical analysis. 
Variables used in the work of Shumway (2001) and Campbell et al. (2008) are also included in this list. 
Category Variable Definition 
Accounting WCTA Working Capital/Total Assets 
 RETA Retained Earnings/Total Assets 
 EBITTA Earnings before Interests and Taxes/ Total Assets 
 METL Market Equity/Total Liabilities 
 STA Sales/Total Assets 
 NITA Net Income/Total Assets 
 NIMTA Net Income/Market Value of Total Assets 
 TLTA Total Liabilities/Total Assets 
 TLMTA Total Liabilities/Market Value of Total Assets 
 CASHMTA Cash and Short-term Investments/Market Value of Total Assets 
Market EXRET Monthly Returns on Firm minus Value-weighted Market Returns   
 SIGMA Standard Deviation of Firm’s Daily Equity Return over Last 3 Month 
 RELSIZE Log [Firm Market Capitalisation/Market Capitalisation of S&P 500]  
 MB Market Value/Book Value 
 PRICE Log [Price per Share Winsorised above $15] 
Systemic Risk FMVOL SIGMA/Average Standard Deviation of 20 Largest Financial 
Institutions Equity Returns over Last 3 Month 
 RELVOL RELSIZE*Average Standard Deviation of 20 Largest Financial 
Institutions Equity Returns over Last Month 
 CLDEF Firm Debts in Current Liabilities*Default Spread over Last Month 
 RELLR RELSIZE*Average Market Leverage Ratio of Financial Institutions 
over Last Month 
 
